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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The second half of the twentieth century emerged with two important concepts 
of the economic world. In the start of the second half, economists, develop-
mentalists, etc., introduced the idea of “development”, while; latter it was replaced 
by a more meaningful and attractive term “sustainable development”. Sustainable 
development is defined as “balancing the fulfillment of human needs with the 
protection of the natural environment so that these needs can be met not only in the 
present, but also in the indefinite future” [Wikipedia (2007)]. Or “Sustainable 
development means that pattern of development that permits future generations to 
live at least as well as the current generation” [Todaro and Smith (2005)], eighth 
edition]. The field of sustainable development can be conceptually broken into four 
constituent parts: environmental sustainability, economic sustainability, social 
sustainability and political sustainability. Although, the word sustainable 
development is very vast and deep, but the main emphasis of our study will be on 
environmental sustainability.  
Environmental sustainability means “the ability of the environment to continue to 
function properly indefinitely” [Wikipedia (2007)]. It means to fulfill the needs of present 
generation without endangering the demands and desires of the future generations. That 
is, we should satisfy our means as efficiently as possible but not at the cost of our coming 
generations. “Unsustainable situation” occurs when the natural capital (total sum of 
natural resources) is used at a pace faster than it can be reproduced. Thus sustainability 
requires that natural resources should be used at a rate at which they can be replenished 
naturally. Difference between sustainable and unsustainable situations can be cleared 
from the given Table 1.  
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Table 1 
Differences between Sustainable and Unsustainable Environment 
Consumption of Renewable Resources State of Environment Sustainability 
More than nature’s ability to replenish Environmental degradation Not sustainable 
Equal to nature’s ability to replenish Environmental equilibrium Steady-state sustainability 
Less than nature’s ability to replenish Environmental renewal Sustainable development 
Source:  Wikipedia (2007).  
However, most of the countries generally and the third world specifically have 
unsustainable mode of production. If these developing countries have grow at this pace of 
un-sustainability, they will face a very dark future for their coming generations. These 
hot debates motivated us to conduct a study for LDCs and particularly for selected South 
Asian countries including Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. Because these 
countries have seen a lot of climatic changes in the form of floods, heavy rainfalls, and 
rising temperature in the last decade or two. In addition, weak institutions and high level 
of corruption in these countries possess a great problem for economic development and 
environmental improvement [Transparency International (2006)]. 
The objective of this study is to address the above-mentioned issue of 
sustainability. That is, to explore the main economic, social, and political factors that are 
responsible for environmental degradation in the selected sample. Nevertheless, due to 
high level of integration and globalisation, the importance of trade is increased manifold. 
In today’s globalise world, no one can live separately. One has to compete with the world 
and enter the world market to survive. Most of the traders support free trade for 
environmental improvement, while environmentalists are highly critical to their 
viewpoint. To compare different views about environmental protection is also one of the 
goals of our analysis. 
The paper proceeds as follow. Section 2 outlines a review of important theoretical 
and empirical findings in previous studies on corruption, trade, income, and 
environmental standards.  In Section 3, we discuss the data sets and construction of 
variables used in the analysis.  Section 4 presents the theoretical framework of the study.  
In Section 5, we show our results in the context of the literature, while Section 6 
concludes.   
2.  REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Theoretical and empirical literature related to the field of corruption, output, trade, 
and environmental stringency is already well developed and comprehensive. Here, the 
reader is referred to some important theoretical and empirical backgrounds of this issue. 
Some of these studies are presented to show the impact of corruption, trade liberalisation, 
and output level on the quality of environmental policies. 
Considers six indicators of ambient air and water pollution for 106 countries to 
find the impact of corruption on environmental degradation, Welsch (2002) showed that 
even if corruption reduces pollution via its effect on income, the direct effects of 
corruption invariably dominate this indirect effect. While testing three predictions to 
explain the relationship between trade liberalisation, corruption, and environmental 
protection for a mix of 48 developed and developing countries, Damania, et al. (2003) 
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establish that firstly, corruption reduces the pollution tax. Secondly, pollution tax in a 
protected sector is high if the level of corruption is high; and pollution tax in an anti-
protected sector is high if the corruption level is low.  Thirdly, high level of awareness 
among consumers raises the pollution tax; while increase in corruption distorts this 
behaviour. The study supports the first two predictions, while the first part of third 
prediction rejected but accepts the second one.  
An empirical analysis performs by Pellegrini (2003) to test the relationship 
between corruption, economic development, and environmental policy. The results 
confirm that institutions are relevant determinants of the income level of countries. It also 
highlights that, if environmental quality demand is increasing with income and sound 
institutions foster economic development, institutional quality will produce stricter 
environmental policies. Similar study conducted by Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2006) for the 
enlarged EU to analyse a statistically significant relationship between Corruption-
Perception Index and Environmental Regulatory Regime Index. It also observed that 
corruption level is a more important determinant of environmental deterioration than 
income level per capita. In a related literature, Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2006) study the 
impact of democracy and corruption on environmental quality. The results of the study 
show that the corruption variable has sizeable statistically significant negative effects on 
environmental policy. However, democracy when used with corruption declines its size 
and significant, but its impact is still positive. 
The relationship between corruption and environment is also examined by Cole 
(2007). Both the direct and indirect effects of corruption on environmental regulations 
were investigated. The direct effects of corruption on environment are positive, while the 
indirect effects are highly significant and negative. However, the net impact of corruption 
on air pollution is negative.  
Grossman and Krueger (1991) were the first to develop the idea of Environmental 
Kuznets Curve (EKC); that there exists some relationship between output level and 
environmental quality. This relationship was called an inverted U-shaped EKC. Related 
to this issue, Zarzoso and Morancho (2004) present an empirical estimate for a panel of 
22 OECD countries. Their results point to the existence of an N-shaped EKC for the 
majority of the countries under analysis. Khana and Plassmann (2004) perform a research 
that favours EKC for USA for the period 1990. The study suggests that even high-income 
households in the USA have not yet reached the income level at which their demand for 
better environmental quality is high enough to cause the income–pollution relationship to 
turn downwards for all the pollutants that have analysed. However, Deacon and Norman 
(2004) get the proofs for EKC within individual countries. Actually its objective is to 
discover whether this hypothesis is valid for individual countries of different level of 
income and development. The study shows that most of the observed patterns could 
easily have occurred by chance.  
Works on the possible theoretical explanation for the EKC in the framework of 
endogenous growth model, Dinda (2005) suggests that each country should allocate one 
part of their capital for abatement activity. The model also explains that environmental 
degradation continues at early stage because of insufficient investment for abatement 
activity, but in later stage, sufficient investment prevents further degradation of 
environmental quality. The dynamic relationship between EKC and degree of corruption 
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is investigated by Leitao (2006). The study confirms the existence of an inverted U-
shaped relationship between per capita sulfur emissions and income. 
In the present world, every economy has an access to the international market. It 
can integrate to import various inputs from around the globe to produce more efficiently. 
The reality of this globalisation is an increasingly inter-reliant world. So, as the economic 
world grows, free trade has become an essential for it. However, researchers concerns 
have been directed towards sustainable development rather than development. 
Beghin, et al. (1999) investigates the linkages between trade integration, 
environmental degradation and public health. It explains that opening to world markets 
bring on a sizeable aggravation of pollution emissions. Similar results were also derived 
by Abler, et al. (1999) who examine the environmental impacts of trade liberalisation in 
Costa Rica in a CGE model. It investigate out that the impacts of trade liberalisation on 
the environmental indicators are generally negative in sign but small or moderate in 
magnitude, both when technology is constant and when technology is allowed to vary.  
Grether, et al. (2007) investigate the decomposition of worldwide SO2 emissions 
from period 1990 to 2000. Adding up the effects of technology, scale, and decomposition 
leaves with a total decrease in SO2 emissions of 10 percent from 1990 to 2000. Its 
conclusion is that, the opening up to trade leads to an increase of roughly 10 percent in 
emissions in 1990 while the corresponding increase is much smaller in 2000 (3.5 
percent). This idea was also supported by Birdsall and Wheeler (1992) that investigates 
that with trade liberalisation, higher environmental standards of industrialised countries 
are “imported” to developing countries: more open-economy experienced faster growth 
in clean industries. However, Antweiler, et al. (1998) performs the most comprehensive 
study in this literature. It also builds up the theoretical linkages of trade with environment 
and constructs a reduced form equation that relates the three effects of trade to pollution 
emissions. It also suggests the positive effect of trade on environment.  
3.  DATA DESCRIPTION AND CONSTRUCTION OF VARIABLES 
The key independent variables of our study (trade openness, corruption, and 
income level) will be used to tests the interactions among institutions, economic growth 
and public policies. The institutional variable, i.e., corruption is constructed by 
International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG), a popular index for corruption in 
government affairs. The score of this index ranges from 0 to 6; lower scores indicate 
greater likelihood for government officials to demand special payments and/or bribes 
connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, policy 
protection and loans. The data for corruption level is available from 1983–2006 for mix 
of both developed and developing countries. 
We use four different measures of trade policy (i.e., for openness) to test the 
robustness of our results, because this approach is adopted by many researchers in their 
studies [for example, Damania, et al. (2003), and Bandyopadhyay and Roy (2006)]. 
These measures are: (i) Total amount of trade as a ratio of GDP, (ii) Taxes on 
international trade collected as proportion of total revenue, (iii) Import duties as a 
percentage of tax revenue, and (iv) Export duties as percent of tax revenue. The other 
important control variables are GDP, GDP2, and the two interaction terms of corruption 
with openness and GDP. Other than the corruption variables, the rest of the data have 
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been obtained from the World Development Indicators (2007) of the World Bank for 
various years. Due to the unavailability of corruption data, we arrive at balanced panel of 
4 selected South Asian countries (Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka) over the 
time period 1984–2003. 
There are different indexes available to measure environmental protection, 
stringency, and quality. Indexes like environmental protection stringency index, 
environmental regulatory regime index, environmental sustainability index, etc., 
[Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2006) and Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2006)) are very common in 
this respect. But most of these indexes were constructed for European Union.   However, 
we consider emission of CO2 and SO2 as proxies for environmental protection, 
stringency, deterioration, quality, and standard.  Due to their increasing effects on global 
warming in the second half of the twentieth century, most of the researchers are going to 
use these emissions as their indicators for environmental standard   [Welsch (2002); 
Zarzoso and Morancho (2004); Cole (2007) and Grether, et al. (2007)]. World 
Development Indicators (WDI) is our main source of data for the emission of CO2; 
however data on SO2 is collected from Frontier Research Center for Global Change 
(FRCGC).  
4.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
We follow the model developed by [Damania, et al. (2003)] for our analysis. Their 
work mainly focuses on the interaction effect between corruption and trade openness on 
environmental policy stringency for a mix of 48 developed and developing countries. 
However, our study is an extension in the sense that we analyse this interaction effect for 
selected South Asian countries for the period 1984–2003.   
4.1. The Model 
We consider a small open economy with two perfectly competitive sectors. 
(1) The numeraire sector produces good z, and 
(2) The polluting sector produces good x. 
There are four types of agents in the economy: consumers with and without 
environmental concerns, producers, and the government. There are N consumers, out of 
which a share 0< <1 suffer disutility from pollution. The fraction 
 
is assumed to reflect 
the demand for environmental quality amongst consumers. The utility of consumers with 
environmental concerns is given by 
U = z + u (x) – X,  … … … … … … (1.1) 
Whereas consumers with out environmental concerns have utility given by 
U = z + u (x), … … … … … … … (1.2) 
Where z and x are consumption of the numeraire good and good x, respectively. X is the 
total damage from pollution where is the per-unit damage function, X is the total 
domestic output of good x, and u(x) is a utility function.  
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Trade policies may be of two types, either “protective” or “anti-protective”. Our 
analysis applies to the case where the protected or anti-protected sector is polluting in 
production. Trade policy is assumed to be determined by multilateral negotiations over 
which this small country has negligible influence. Let p* be the world market price of 
good x; consumers’ domestic price is given by P = (1+ )p* if the sector is import 
competing, and p = (1+s)p* if it is exporting. But here, we focus primarily on the former 
one. 
Since production of good x results in local pollution, the government attempts to 
control emissions by levying an emissions tax, t T R+, per unit of pollution. Rewards to 
the sector-specific factor are denoted as (PN). By Hotelling’s Lemma, total output of the 
polluting good is given by X (PN)= 
 
(PN)/ PN.  
FOC with respect to abatement is  
,01)(
A
tX
A
PN 
… … … … … (2) 
Import volume of good x equal to 
M(PN) = Nd(P)–X(PN).  … … … … … … (3) 
The net revenue accruing to the government from the emission tax and tariffs is 
thus equal to r(t, ) = p* M(P N) + t X(PN). Since rewards to the owners of the sector-
specific factor depend on the trade policy and the pollution tax, they have an incentive to 
lobby the government for more favourable policies. But, since the trade policy is assumed 
exogenously determined in multilateral negotiations, lobbying is focused only on the 
pollution tax rate.       
4.2.  The Political Equilibrium 
This section examines how bribery by the lobby affects the political equilibrium 
pollution tax. This process is proceeding as follows. In the first period, the producer 
lobby group offers the government a bribe schedule, S(t), which is contingent on the 
environmental policy stance of the government. In the subsequent period, the government 
determines its optimal environmental policy, and collects the associated bribe. Finally, 
firms determine production and abatement levels taking the tariff and environmental 
policy as given. Since the organised producer lobby contains few individuals, and thus 
has a utility function given by  
V(t, ) = (PN), … … … … … … … (4) 
The government is assumed to maximise a weighted sum of the bribe received and social 
welfare equal to  
G(t, ) = S(t) + aW(t, ),  … … … … … … (5) 
Where W(t, ) is aggregate social welfare and a >0 is the weight given by the government 
to social welfare relative to the bribe. a represents the government’s willingness to set 
policies that deviates from the welfare maximising level in return for bribes, and 
therefore is a useful measure of the level of corruption. Aggregate social welfare is given 
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by the sum of factor rewards, labour income, consumer surplus, tariff and pollution tax 
revenues, minus the damage from pollution: 
W(t, ) = (PN) + L + NC(P) + r(t, ) – N X(PN), … … … (6) 
From the first order condition for (6), the welfare maximising pollution tax is given by  
wt = N + 
t
A
AXP
X
P
Xp
N
N
2
*  
… … … … (7) 
Where the second term is positive. Note that with 
 
> 0, the second-best tax rate tw is set 
above the marginal disutility from pollution, given by N. We assume that 2 W(t, )/ 
t2<0. 
The Nash equilibrium pollution tax, t*, can be found using the following two 
necessary conditions: 
               t* = arg maxt S*(t) + a W(t, ) on T, … … … … (C1) 
               t* = arg maxt [ V(t, )  – S*(t) ]  + [S*(t) + a W(t, )] on T. … … (C2) 
Condition (C1) requires that the equilibrium policy, t*, maximises the government’s 
utility function, while by (C2) the tax also maximises the joint utility of the lobby and the 
government. The equilibrium characterisation is found by taking the first-order 
conditions of (C1) and (C2),  
,0,
***
t
tW
t
tS
and  … … … … … (8) 
.0,,
******
t
tW
t
tS
t
tS
t
tV 
… … … …   (9) 
Substituting (8) into (9) yields 
,
,
***
t
tS
t
tV
… … … … … … (10) 
The characterisation of the equilibrium pollution tax is found by substituting condition 
(10) into (8), which yields 
.0,,
**
t
tW
t
tV
t
G 
… … … … … (11) 
In equilibrium, the government trades off bribe and social welfare at a rate of a. 
Expanding terms in (11) (using (4) and (6)) yields 
.0, *2
B
NN
A P
Xp
P
X
t
A
A
XNtX
t
tG 
… (12) 
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Note from (12) that the political equilibrium tax must be lower than under welfare 
maximisation. To see this, observe that term A is negative, hence term B must be positive 
which from (7) requires t < tw.  Note also that for sufficiently small , t < N. We make the 
following assumption regarding the tax rate. 
Assumption.   The political equilibrium pollution tax rate is sufficiently small 
such that t < 
 
N.  
4.3. Model Specification 
In this section, we study the effects of corruption, environmental concerns, and 
trade liberalisation on the politically determined pollution taxes and in particular their 
interaction effects.   
Prediction 1.  In the political equilibrium, corruption reduces the pollution tax.  
Proof.    Totally differentiate (12) and rearrange: 
.0
2
2
*2
t
G
P
Xp
P
X
t
A
A
XNt
d
dt NN 
… … … (13) 
The sign follows from (a) the assumption that 2G/ t2<0, and (b) from (12) we know that 
the numerator is positive (t<tw).   
Prediction 2.   In the political equilibrium, trade liberalisation:    
(i) Increases (decreases) the pollution tax in a protected sector if the level of 
corruption is high (low);  
(ii) Increases (decreases) the pollution tax in an anti-protected sector if the level of 
corruption is low (high). 
Proof.    Totally differentiate (12) and yields 
2
2
**
t
G
P
X
t
A
AP
XNtp
P
Xp
ds
dt
d
dt
B
NN
A
N
,     … … (14) 
Where the denominator is negative by assumption. The sign of the numerator depends on 
the relative size of terms A and B, which are positive under assumption 1: (a) it follows 
that as corruption increases (14) becomes negative since term A dominates and vice-
versa. Hence, for sufficiently low (high) a trade liberalisation in a protected sector always 
increases (decreases) the pollution tax. That is, .0
2
2
*
t
G
P
Xp
d
dtLim
N 
And, (b) 
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since in an anti-protected sector the trade policy instrument has a negative sign ( <0, 
s<0), trade liberalisation implies an increase in the parameter value, and the sign of (14) 
is reversed in this case. 
Trade openness affects the pollution tax through two channels. On one hand, trade 
openness reduces output in the polluting sector. Due to low production, the marginal 
benefits from corruption fall, which induce the bribe offer to declines. Hence, the 
pollution tax rises through this channel (term A). On the other hand, if the existing level 
of corruption is low and an open policy is implemented, the result will be reversed (term 
B).   
Prediction 3.    In the political equilibrium,   
(i) An increase in the share of the consumers with environmental concerns raises 
the pollution tax, and   
(ii) The effect disappears as corruption increases. 
Proof.    Totally differentiate (12) and rearrange:  
.0
2
2
2
t
G
P
X
t
A
A
XN
d
dt N 
… … … … … (15) 
The denominator and the numerator are unambiguously negative. The greater the 
share of the population suffering disutility from pollution, the greater the equilibrium 
pollution taxes. However, this effect on disutility from pollution only translates into 
policy changes to the extent that welfare matters to the government.  
Thus our main equation for regression is as follow: 
Emissions of CO2 and SO2 = 0 + 1Openness + 2Corruption + 3GDP + 4GDP2   
                                              + 5Corruption*Openness + 6 Corruption*GDP + e  
5.  ESTIMATIONS AND RESULTS 
Here, we present the results of our estimation in detail. FIXED EFFECTS MODEL 
is used to estimate the impact of trade liberalisation, corruption and GDP on the 
stringency of environmental policies. We consider CO2 as a dependent variable and 
perform some essential tests. The increased level of emissions of these gases (CO2 and 
SO2)1 in the last decade or two, leads economists and environmentalists to increase their 
focus of research on these two chemicals [Grether, et al. (2007); Cole (2007); Zarzoso 
and Morancho (2004)].  
5.1.  CO2 as a Measure of Environmental Protection 
Table 2 summarises the findings of regressions when CO2 is used as a proxy for 
environmental quality. To study the impact of openness on CO2 emissions, the given table 
shows  four  different variables that were used as indicators of free economy; namely, trade,   
1We have also considered SO2 as an indicator of environmental protection and performed the required 
tests to show the robustness of our results (see Appendix). 
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Table 2    
Corruption, Trade Openness, and Environmental Quality 683
taxes on international trade, import and export tariffs. Eight separate regressions were run to 
test the robustness of the different openness proxies as well as of interaction terms.  
5.1.1.  Trade as a Measure of Openness 
The first and second columns of Table 2 show the estimates from the regression 
model when trade is considered as a measure of openness. The empirical results in these 
two columns provide co-efficient estimates that are consistent with the theory and 
statistically significant at the p<0.05 level, which is associated with decrease in CO2 
emissions, signalling an increase in environmental protection. This finding suggests that 
as an economy becomes more open, it tends to have stringent environmental standards, 
which are also consistent with the results of Grether, et al. (2007). There are two ways 
through which openness affect the environmental quality. Firstly, its direct impact on 
CO2 emissions and the second one is through as an interaction term with corruption 
(corruption* openness). The total impact of trade on environmental quality at the sample 
mean of corruption =  CO2/
 
Trade= –0.008+0.001(2.26) = –0.00574 (first column). 
This estimate suggests that as the volume of trade increases by one standard deviation 
(about 0.10), the level of CO2 emission decreases by 0.00574 metric tons per capita. 
Result like this was also studied by Ferrantino (1997). It means that openness have a 
significant positive impact on environmental protection.  
The effects of corruption on pollution level (CO2 emissions) indicates that as the 
corruption index increases (corruption level falls) by one standard deviation point, CO2 
emissions decreased by 0.035 metric tons per capita as indicated by the significance of 
the corruption co-efficient at p<0.05 level. The results suggest that corruption level has a 
greater absolute impact on environmental protection as compared to openness, which is 
also analysed by Damania, et al. (2003), Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2006). Nevertheless, its 
total impact depends on its direct effects and its interaction effects with openness,  
CO2/ Corruption= –0.035+0.001(38.22) =0.0032 (first column), a one unit increase of 
corruption index is associated with decrease of 0.0032 per capita metric tons of CO2. 
The sign and significance of the GDP and GDP2 (p<0.05) confirms the inverted U-
shaped Environmental Kuntz Curve (EKC), that was also tested by Deacon and Norman 
(2004), and Khana and Plassman (2004) in their studies. This EKC relationship is not 
workable if an economy faces high level of corruption, that was also highlight by Leitao 
(2006) and Welsh (2002) in their researches. The statistically significant coefficient of 
the interaction variable corruption*GDP (p < 0.05 level) in the second column confirms 
the theory that people demand for environmental quality increases as their income level 
rises, but this income effect is offset by high level of corruption in the economy. 
The estimates of another interaction term corruption*openness is also highly 
significant at the p<0.05 level support the results of the theoretical model. The sign of 
this interaction effect is positive shows that as the level of corruption raises, the impact of 
trade on the stringency of the environmental regulations increases. The interaction 
coefficient also provides a sense of the effects of governmental corruption level under 
different trade regimes that was also deliberate by Damania, et al. (2003). The impact of 
corruption level on pollution is high relatively in closed economies, which is consistent 
with theory that corruption and protection are complements in the creation of 
environmental policy distortions. 
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5.1.2.  Taxes as a Measure of Openness 
The third and fourth columns in Table 2 represent regression results for a model 
when tax on international trade considered as an indicator for openness. In these 
regression estimates, the co-efficient of corruption, GDP, and of the both interaction 
terms are statistically significant, which support the theoretical arguments of the model. 
However, the coefficient of openness variable is small and statistically insignificant; 
indicate that tax measure should be using with caution while performing such study. 
Because in all LDCs including our sample, data on taxes have more biased-ness in 
reporting and collection as compared to trade.  
5.1.3.  Import Duties as a Measure of Openness 
The sign and statistical significance of the interaction variables as well as the idea 
of EKC are supported by the result of the regressions present in columns 5 and 6 of Table 
2, when import duties are used as a liberalisation measure. The corruption coefficient is 
significant in one of the two regressions, signalling that highly corrupt countries have less 
stringent pollution policies. The coefficient of corruption*openness is negative, implying 
the effect of import duties on CO2 emissions decreases as the value of the corruption 
index increases (i.e., corruption falls). The sign of the interaction effect is consistent 
across regression models and implies that distorted trade policies increase the influence 
of corruption on environmental policy.   
5.1.4.  Export Duties as a Measure of Openness 
As the value of export duties is diminishing in such a globalise world, but we 
consider it here to check the robustness of our results. Most of the estimators in columns 
7 and 8 of Table 2 are significant except a few one. These results further support the 
theory of the model. Export duties on trade confirm the sign of all parameters including 
interaction estimators.  
6.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
To transform theory and empirical statistics into policy implications, policy 
makers should consider the dynamic, complex, and technical relationships that exist in an 
open economy. Our objective is to analyse these technical relationships for selected 
South Asian countries.   
6.1.  Conclusions  
As the impacts of trade and corruption on environmental standards are dynamic 
and technical in an open economy, most of the literature on trade and environment did 
not give much importance in the past as they are doing in the present. Due to increased 
importance of corruption in most of the LDC’s economies in the recent past, current 
researchers have diverted their attention to study this side of the environmental issue.  
Our findings show that there are positive effects of trade on environmental quality. 
It suggests that countries with more open trade regimes have stringent environmental 
policies and low level of emissions. Open economies may lead to import cleaner 
technologies and divert production from dirty to clean sectors and industries. However, 
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the estimates suggest that these impacts are conditional upon on the level of 
governmental corruption. The interaction variable corruption*openness indicates that in a 
protected sector, the impact of trade liberalisation on environmental standards increases if 
the level of corruption is high while in anti-protected economy these effects become 
reversed. It means that corruption and close economies act like a complements for 
environmental policy distortions (high emissions of chemicals). 
Institutional variable like corruption have negative impact on environmental 
protection. Its absolute value is higher than that of the estimator of openness in all-
alternative specifications. Therefore, authorities should give more emphasis on 
institutions to correct the distortions. Moreover, the reduction in corruption has a greater 
effect on environmental policy in relatively closed economies.  
The results of our analysis also reveal that environmental quality is a normal good, 
i.e., its demand increases with increase in income. Our study supports this view of 
environmental quality demand. But like trade, this outcome of income on environmental 
protection also depends on the level of corruption in the economy. The interaction effect 
corruption*GDP outlines that corruption distorts people’s preferences to optimal policy 
formation. All this shows that the idea of EKC depends on the level of corruption in the 
economy or it is not necessary that every country should follow the path of Kuznets curve 
in their emissions. 
In short, the effects of trade and output-level on environmental protection depend 
on the level of government honesty in the economy. Therefore, care should be observed 
while performing such studies in much complicated societies and economies.  
6.2.  Policy Implications 
Several policy implications emerge from our analysis. Firstly, trade liberalisation 
reduces environmental emissions of CO2 and SO2 in all sectors of the economy by 
increasing the stringency of environmental policy. Policy makers should try to open their 
borders as quickly as possible to gain from double dividend of trade, i.e., high level of 
consumer and producer goods and clean and healthy environment.  It is also a guide for 
environmentalists who believe that trade distorts environmental standards. 
Environmentalists should also design policies and pursue the authorities that trade 
liberalisation have more benefits to the society as compared to its costs. 
However, policy makers should also keep an eye on other important variables, 
institutions and factors, (like corruption, democracy, etc.,) which exploit and distorts this 
positive relationship. That is, they should consider the effects of corruption in the 
economy while drawing any conclusions and making any welfare policy regarded to 
environmental protectionism, because the level of corruption in our sample area 
negatively affects these impacts of openness on emissions. Another important policy 
implication is that the level of governmental corruption in the economy also violates 
environmental protection demand. It shows that people’s demand for environmental 
protection is not converted to optimal policy making. Therefore the authority should 
consider and keep an eye on their institutions while making any welfare directed policy. 
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